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DEFAMATION AFTER FIRESTONE:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
EFFORT TO ZERO IN ON THE PUBLIC FIGURE
Dovre C. Jensen, Jr. *
In December, 1967, after a 17-month divorce trial complete with sensa-
tional testimony and national news coverage, Russell Firestone, the heir to the
rubber fortune, was granted a divorce from his wife, Mary Alice. A week later,
Time magazine reported the divorce as having been granted to Mr. Firestone on
the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.' Although Mr. Firestone had sought
divorce on those two grounds, Mrs. Firestone brought a libel action against Time
arguing that its report of adultery was not a ground upon which the divorce decree
was granted and therefore the report was false, malicious and defamatory.2 The
case remained in the Florida appellate process until 1974, when the Florida
Supreme Court upheld a $100,000 judgment against Time Inc.3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone4 and addressed four issues. The first issue was whether Mrs. Firestone
was a public figure5 under the Court's recent decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 6  If so, she would have been required to prove that Time had published its
defamatory report of her divorce proceeding with actual malice.7 In deciding
that she was not a public figure, the Court narrowed the Gertz definition of publi,
figure by confining determinations of this status to three mutually exclusive
standards.8 The second issue was whether a news report of a judicial proceeding
deserves the protection of the actual malice standard even if the report is de-
famatorily false or inaccurate. 9 The Court held that the Constitution provides
no "blanket privilege for reports of judicial proceedings." '0 This confirmed what
Gertz had implied: that the constitutional protection afforded reports of judicial
proceedings depended on whether the defamed person is a public or a private
*B.A., The Citadel, 1971; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1978.
1. Time, Milestones, December 22, 1967, at 77.
2. The divorce court did not grant the divorce decree on any of Florida's eight recognized statu-
tory grounds for divorce, but rather granted it because neither party was domesticated. In 1972, the Florida
Supreme Court agreed with the divorce court's conclusion that the facts warranted that the Firestone mar-
riage should be terminated, albeit on the different yet legally acceptable ground of extreme cruelty. Firestone
v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972). Two years later and during Mrs. Firestone's suit against Time,
the Fl6rida Supreme Court noted that Florida law in effect in 1967 precluded the awarding of alimony to a
wife found guilty of adultery. Since Mrs. Firestone had been awarded alimony, the court concluded she had
not been found guilty of adultery. "A careful examination of the final decree prior to publication would have
clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty, . . .This is a
flagrant example of 'journalistic negligence.' " Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974).
3. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
4. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
S. See text accompanying notes 55-99 infra.
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 55-99 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 112-131 infra.
10. 424 U.S. at 456.
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figure."The third issue was whether Time's report of the divorce proceedings
was accurate or inaccurate. 12 The Court decided that the constitutional interest
in assuring the freedoms of speech and press to publishers emphasized in Gertz
dictated that more tolerance for inaccuracy be afforded reports of judicial pro-
ceedings concerning those persons subject to the actual malice standard than
similar reports concerning those persons subject to a state fault standard of less
than actual malice. 13 The fourth issue was whether Gertz required Mrs. Firestone
to prove actual injury to her reputation 14 The Court determined that a state can
permit a defamed private person to forego proving his reputation was damaged
and compensate this person for other actual injuries upon a showing of fault. 15
The Court thereby neutralized the protection that the actual injury requirement
of Gertz provided against uncontrolled jury discretion in awarding defamation
damages.' 6 The Court, however, after deciding the issues in Mrs. Firestone's
favor, vacated and remanded her libel judgment because no Florida court in find-
ing Time liable applied any type of fault standard as required by Gertz. 17
Firestone is the Court's first application of its new approach to mass
media defamation as outlined in the Gertz decision. As such, it is the latest addi-
tion to a continuing effort by the Court to strike the balance between the legiti-
mate state interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens through its libel laws
and the constitutional interest in protecting speech and the press. This note ex-
amines the Court's development of the constitutional protections to be applied in
cases of mass media defamation, considers the current status of these judge-made
protections in view of the Court's recent pronouncements in the Firestone case,
and evaluates the need for legislation in the current transformation of defamation
law by the Court.
DEFAMATION AND THE LIABILITY OF THE MASS MEDIA
THROUGH GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC.: A SHORT HISTORY
Prior to the landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 8the judge-
made common law developed a qualified privilege 9 of fair comment which, ab-
sent proof of malice 20 or excessive publication, 21 absolved the media from
liability for commenting about matters of public concern or upon people involved
with the public's welfare. 2 Despite this unequivocal privilege, courts disagreed
11. See text accompanying notes 112-131 infra.
12. Supra note 11.
13. Supra note 11.
14. See text accompanying notes 100-111 infra.
15. Supra note 14.
16. Supra note 14.
17. 424 U.S. at 464.
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. The defense of privilege emanates from the recognition that certain conduct otherwise action-
able may so further an interest deemed important to society that it is entitled to immunity. Where the privi-
lege is not thought to be of paramount importance to society, it is qualified and can be lost by abuse. Re-
statement of Torts, Introductory Note, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B, at 223 (1938).
20. The malice required to defeat the privilege occurs when the defamatory opinion is not pub-
lished to further the interest for which the privilege is given, namely, the promotion of public awareness and
discussion of matters of public concern, but rather is made from spite or ill-will. Supra note 19 at sec. 603.
21. Excessive publication is proven by showing the defamatory opinion was knowingly published
to persons not having a bona fide interest in the matter communicated. Supra note 19 at sec. 604.
22. See supra note 19 at sec. 606.
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as to its application. The majority of courts applied the privilege solely to state-
ments of opinion provided that the supporting facts were true,23 whereas a mi-
nority of courts applied the privilege "to misstatements of fact as well as opinion
about the conduct of public officials, at least if such misstatements were not neg-
ligent, deliberate or reckless." ,24
In New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this minority
position and held that the Constitution limits a state's power to award libel dam-
ages to a public official. In short, the Court firmly established that the First
Amendment guarantees the privilege to make defamatory statements concerning
official conduct unless such statements were made with actual malice. This term
has been defined as knowledge of the statement's falsity or reckless disregard as to
whether the statement was false or not. 25 The Court's position, at least with re-
gard to public officials, protected the media even more than did the common
law's fair comment privilege. This decision marked the starting point of the Court's
10-year effort to widen the scope of this new constitutional privilege.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,26 although the Court admitted that its decision in
New York Times had left the parameters of the public official category unclear,
the strong interest in debating public issues and the persons in a position to in-
fluence the resolution of those issues, required that the designation of public
official for purposes of the New York Times actual malice standard apply "at the
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the con-
duct of governmental affairs."
2 7
In 1967, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 28 the Court expanded the
scope of this privilege. It required that the actual malice standard be applied
to defamation cases brought by a public figure, and defined this public figure
category as a non-public official who, by reason of his personal fame or noto-
riety or his intimate involvement "in the resolution of important public ques-
tions . . . shape[s] events in areas of concern to society at large." '29 Since the
public evinces a continuing public interest in him, the public figure, like the
public official, has "ready access . . . to [the] mass media of communication,
both to influence policy and to counter criticism of [his] views and activities."1
30
On the heels of this important expansion of the actual malice standard
came Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 3 where the Court made it clear that
the actual malice standard to be met by public persons suing for defamation was
not satisfied by evidence indicating the publisher was motivated by spite or ill-
will towards the public official or public figure. Further, in St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 32 the Court provided its requirement for proving the reckless disregard
23. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 819 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
24. 1 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Torts 106 (1969); Prosser, supra note 23, at 820.
25. 376 U.S. at 279-280.
26. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
27. Supra note 26 at 85. To gauge the types of positions which state courts have included under
this definition see Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 Texas L. Rev. 199, 220 at n. 139 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
28. .88 U.S. 130 (1967).
29. Supra note 28 at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
30. Supra note 29.
31. 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
32. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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portion of the actual malice standard: a showing, supported by sufficient evidence,
that the publisher, despite any negligence or failure to investigate on his part,
"in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." ' 33  Thus, it
had become apparent that the Court's concern that false and defamatory state-
ments about persons involved in matters of public concern should be afforded
First Amendment protection because such statements, made without actual
malice, promoted "free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance-
the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment - . . ." As
such, the states' legitimate interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens
became obscured in the light of the First Amendment.
In theMonitor Patriot Co. v. Roy3" and Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron 36
decisions of 1971, the Court extended the reach of the actual malice standard
protections to include statements concerning candidates for public office. These
cases reflected the Court's attitude, expressed in Garrison v. Louisiana,3 7 that
the protections of the actual malice standard are not restricted to comments
about the "official conduct" of a public official; rather, any statement "which
might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant" 38 and thereby pro-
tected by the actual malice standard. In short, Monitor and Ocala signaled that
the Court interpreted relevance broadly and in the interest of protecting the free
flow of information to the public concerning its public servants, defamed public
officials would be required, in most conceivable instances, to prove actual malice
in order to recover.
The anticipated upshot of the Court's seven-year progressive increase of
the applicability of the actual malice standard came in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc. 39 Here, a plurality of the Court held that, regardless of the status of
the person defamed, the First Amendment protects all speech on matters of
public or general interest except that speech made with knowing or reckless
falsity. 4' Five members of the Court agreed that a defamed private individual
involved in an event of public or general interest had the burden of proving actual
malice. The three dissenters argued that in private libel the defamed private person
should be required to show the publisher was negligent in order to recover any
damages. 4 They advocated that each state-should be required to determine
33. Supra note 32 at 731.
34. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
35. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
36. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
37. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
38. Supra note 37 at 77.
39. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
40. See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in
Libel Cases? 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 371, 377-378 (1970), in which the writer forecasted that adoption of the
Rosenbloom privilege to report on matters of public interest would be a complete break with common law
libel and could make a public official/public figure privilege irrelevant. In addition, prior to Rosenbloom,
many lower courts had already extended the application of the actual malice standard to publications pos-
sessing a valid public interest. See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Blackmun, Brennan, and Warren plurality was concurred in by Justice Black and Justice White.
Black argued that the First Amendment protects the news media from libel judgments even if the publication
is made with knowledge of its falsity, and would have preferred the holding to have absolved the press from all
libel judgments. 403 U.S. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in judgment). White posited that the First Amendment
gives the media the privilege to report and comment on the official actions of public servants in full detail,
and that the actual malice standard applies to those persons, public or private, involved in or affected by that
official action. Supra at 62 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
41. 403 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting);id. at 86-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 4: 147
Defamation After Firestone
an applicable negligence standard, but no state would be permitted to impose a
strict liability standard. 42 The dissenters further argued that defamation dam-
ages should be awarded on proof of actual damage, although they disagreed as to
the efficacy of awards of punitive damages. 4
In summary, Rosenbloom signaled that certain members of the Court
recognized differences between the public and the private defamation plaintiff
that warranted greater protection for the latter in order to promote freedom of
the press without abolishing the states' interest in compensating its citizens for
actual harm done to their reputations. This decision, which effectively insulated
all speech dealing with public issues from defamation liability, was to be short-
lived.
In 1973, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a libel case from the
Seventh Circuit, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. " In this case, the defendant, the
publisher of the John Birch Society's magazine American Opinion, published
an article expanding his running commentary concerning the supposed nation-
wide Communist conspiracy to replace local law enforcement agencies with a
Communist-controlled national police force. He falsely accused the plaintiff,
Elmer Gertz, an attorney hired to represent a family in its civil litigation against
a Chicago police officer convicted of the second degree murder of their son,
of having orchestrated a "frame up" of the policeman, of being a member of an
organization that "'advocated the violent seizure of [the] government,"' and of
having a hefty police record." 5 The Seventh Circuit held that Gertz was re-
quired to show the article was published with actual malice. Relying on Rosen-
bloom, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, pointing
out that the defamatory statements about Gertz concerned a matter in which
there was "significant public interest," namely "the trial of a Chicago police
officer for the crime of murder - or its broader theme - the possible existence of
a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local police officers - ."..46 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed that decision, holding that Gertz was a private figure
and therefore not required to meet the actual malice standard, and remanded the
case for a new trial.47
The Supreme Court's progressive expansion of the actual malice standard
in defamation cases, and the concomitant widening protection afforded the press
against libel judgments, was greatly modified by Gertz. The Court was concerned
with "reconciling the law of defamation with the First Amendment" and identi-
fied its options as (1) extending the actual malice standard to different situations,
(2) varying the level of constitutional privilege according to the defamed person's
42. Supra note 41 at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 86-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Most states permit the jury, in its-discretion, to assess punitive damages over and above any
other compensation it has awarded; this is directed at allowing the jury to punish the defendant or to make
an effort at deterring like conduct in the future. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 9 and McCormick, Damages
see. 118 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]. While Justice Harlan would permit a private plaintiff
proving actual malice to recover punitive damages, Justice Marshall and Justice Stewart regarded punitive
damages as "windfalls" and a basic threat "to society's interest in freedom of the press" and advocated
eliminating them entirely "by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual injuries." 403 U.S. at 77
(Harlan, J., dissenting); iad. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. 471 F. 2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. 418 U.S. at 325-326.
46. 471 F.2d at 805.
47. 418 U.S. at 352.
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status, or (3) granting the press absolute immunity from defamation liability. 48
In selecting the second option, the Court decided that the appropriate standard
for determining whether the media is liable for its defamatory statements is now
dependent on whether the plaintiff is a public official, public figure, or private
figure. The Court said that liability for defamation could no longer be based on
whether the matter involved is solely one of public interest.
The Court recognized that the actual malice requirement substantially
subordinates the state's legitimate power to use its libel laws to compensate its
citizens for wrongful injury to their reputations. The Court found the actual malice
standard necessary to accomodate the competing needs of encouraging the press
to report about matters of public interest and concern, and of protecting the rep-
utation of those who- actively sought public attention or achieved expected
notoriety through their achievements. 19 Moreover, the Court labeled the latter
need a "limited state interest" because the public person enjoyed an access to the
media to rebut false statements and chose to open his life to public scrutiny. The
absence of these factors for private figures, however, required that the state
interest rather than the First Amendment interest be emphasized.5 0
The Court therefore held that when the substance of the media's defama-
tory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, "so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual."5 ' Futhermore, the Court restricted
the relief to be afforded by the states in private defamation cases to compensa-
tion for actual injury. Consequently, awards of presumed or punitive damages
cannot be made unless actual malice is established by the private plaintiff.5 2
48. Supra note 47 at 333.
49. Supra note 47 at 342-343.
50. Supra note 47 at 343-345.
51. Supra note 47 at 347-348. Although the Court did not explicitly outline the standard, three
of the justices indicated the Court was thinking of a negligence standard. Id. at 350; id. at 353 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Many state courts simply follow Gertz and have adopted a negligence standard. See, e.g., Stone v.
Essex County News apers, Inc., - Mass. -, 330 N.E. 2d 161 (1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Company,
86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P. 2d 81 (1976). Additionally, some state courts interpret Gertz as minimally requiring
a negligence standard in private defamation cases. See Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350
A. 2d 688 (1976) (adopted negligence standard set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts sec., 580B (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975) in private defamation). However, certain state courts require private defamation plain-
tiffs to meet a higher standard of fault. See, e.g., Aafco Heating & Air Con. Co. v. Northwest Pub., Inc., -
Ind. App. - , 321 N.E. 2d 580 (1974) (defamed private person involved in an event of general or public
interest must prove actual malice); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y. 2d 196, 341 N.E.
2d 569 (1975) (defamed private person involved in a matter of legitimate public concern must establish
publisher acted with grossly irresponsible conduct).
Arguendo, the Court's omission of a delineated fault standard in defamation actions involving
private persons leaves the common law malice standard viable. Since Gertz only forbids the states to adopt a
fault standard of strict liability, nothing prevents a state from adopting or maintaining an ill-will fault stan-
dard, i.e., one that entities a defamed private person to his actual damages upon proof that the defamatory
report was made because the defendant sought to gratify his personal animosity toward the plaintiff.
52. Presumed damages refers to the common law practice of allowing the jury, in certain instances,
to presume present and future damage to the plaintiff's reputation, sefesteem, and physical and psycholog-
ical well-being, simply from proof that the defamation was communicated to a third party. McCormick,
supra note 43, sec. 116. See Robertson, supra note 27, at 215 where the author concludes that "no definitive
constitutional restriction existed prior to Gertz limiting the availability of presumed and punitive damages.
Gertz requires proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth as a minimum requisite to
recovering presumed and punitive damages, and may signal the complete excision of these concepts from the
law of defamation. Plaintiffs who recover on the lesser showing of fault must prove 'actual injury.' "
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Finally, the most important distinction drawn in Gertz.was that of dis-
tinguishing the public figure from the private figure, since the latter, in most
states, would not have to surmount the actual malice barrier in order to recover
for injury from media defamation. The Court defined a public figure as assuming
"special prominence in the resolution of public questions" and divided the term
into two categories: (1) one who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy" is a public figure "for a limited range of issues"
and (2) one who achieves "such pervasive fame or notoriety" is a public figure
for "all purposes And in all contexts." 53 Within the parameter of these two cat-
egories, the Court indicated that since most evaluations of who is a public figure
would center on the former category, a more meaningful analysis would be had
"by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the par-
ticular controversy giving rise to the defamation." 54
In summary, Gertz said a defamed private person (one who is neither a
public official nor a public figure) is not constitutionally required to prove actual
malice by a publisher who claims, in defense, that his report was privileged be-
cause the private person was engaged in a matter of public or general interest.
The states, without imposing strict liability, may now define the standard for
adjudging a publisher's liability for defamatory statements which injure a private
person. A private person may not, however, recover punitive or presumed damages
absent proof of actual malice. To the extent the private person establishes the
publisher's liability under the respective state standard, he may only recover for
proven actual injury. Thus, the impact of Gertz on the constitutional protection
given defamatory falsehoods by the media was to replace the judicial focus from
that of a predominantly ad hoc judicial determination of whether the publication
in question concerned an issue of general or public interest to that of administer-
ing Court-prescribed criteria for determining the plaintiff's status, public or pri-
vate, and allocating constitutional protection according to that status.
THE IMPACT OF FIRESTONE
1. The Narrowing of the Gertz Standards for a Public Figure
In Firestone, the Court rejected Time's contention that Mrs. Firestone was
a public figure by specifically quoting from the Gertz majority opinion:
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.... we have recently further defined the
meaning of "public figure" for the purposes of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments: "For the most part those who attain this status have as-
sumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public
figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. '" ss
53. 418 U.S. at 351.
54. Supra note 53 at 352.
s. 424 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
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-Thereafter, the Court goes on to evaluate Mrs. Firestone as a public figure solely
in terms of this selected passage. In contrast, Justice Marshall, dissenting and
arguing that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure by the terms of Gertz, evaluates
the concept of public figure from other enumerated criteria in Gertz understood
by him and certain commentators as integral elements of the Gertz public figure
formula. 56
It appears that the Court, by relying entirely on the foregoing passage
from Gertz, has made an intentional omission that has narrowed the standards for
determining who is a public figure. That this omission is significant and planned,
as opposed to fortuitous and inadvertent, can be gleaned from an examination of
the Court's specific language in Gertz and Firestone. The initial language in Gertz
concerning those classified as public figures said that "(TI hose who, by reason of
the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek
the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures. . . ,,s' Further
language indicated that "public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic op-
portunity to counteract false statements than private individuals . 8 Addi-
tionally, the Court noted that
[Al bsent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community,
and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should
not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is prefer-
able to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by
looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.
5 9
In evaluating who is a public figure, the Court stated that the public figure desig-
nation was determined according to two standards:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or noto-
riety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.
More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn
into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special
prominence in the resolution of public questions.
60
Despite this language, the Court, in Firestone, omitted any reference to these
standards for evaluating whether Mrs. Firestone was a public figure. Instead, it
emphasized that public figures are people who "have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society... [or] occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes... [or]
56. Supra note 55 at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law
and The First Amendment, 26 Hastings L.J. 777, 794 (1975) ("Thus, under the reasoning of the majority,
'voluntary notoriety' and 'access to the media' constitute basic criteria of the public figure status."); Com-
ment, As Times Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. And Its Effect on California Defamation Law, 6 Pacific
L.J. 565, 576 (1975) ("The Court suggested several guidelines for categorizing an individual as a public
figure, all of which were based largely upon the rationate that such persons have assumed the risk of public
criticism.")
57. 418 U.S. at 342.
58. Supra note 57 at 344.
59. Supra note 57 at 352.
60. Supra note 57 at 351.
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have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved." ' 61 This shift in emphasis by
the Court is crucially significant when examined in terms of what both passages
included. First, both recognize a public figure for all purposes, but in a different
sense. While Gertz emphasized "pervasive fame or notoriety ' 62 Firestone empha-
sizes "persuasive power and influence." '63 Second, Gertz recognized a class of
involuntary public figures who are "drawn into a particular public controversy" 64
whereas Firestone does not. Conversely, Firestone emphasizes a public figure who
assumes a role "of especial prominence in the affairs of society ' 65 whereas Gertz
did not. Here, the distinguishing emphasis is on voluntariness. Although qualifying
language in Gertz indicated that such persons "assume special prominence in
the resolution of public questions, ' 66 the logical connotation implied here is
that any assumption of leadership in resolving a public issue will come after being
involuntarily brought into a public controversy. Third, both recognize a public
figure who voluntarily injects or thrusts himself into a particular public con-
troversy, yet Firestone draws a crucial conjunctive distinction, namely, the pur-
pose must be "in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
' 67
Thus, by examining the standards emphasized by Firestone in light of the lan-
guage discussing the concept of a public figure in Gertz, one can fairly infer that
the Court in Firestone recognized that although Gertz reaffirmed the public figure
doctrine, it had left the range of its application cloudy.
Therefore, by applying the three mutually exclusive standards to evaluate
whether Mrs. Firestone was a public figure, the Court: (1) reaffirmed an all-
purpose public figure category measured from the standard of "persuasive power
and influence"; (2) reiterated a standard applied to one who assumes a role of
"especial prominence in the affairs of society" and eliminated the involuntary
public figure standard that allowed one to be "drawn into a public controversy";
and (3) emphasized that the third and final standard for defining a public figure
not only requires that one thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy,
but that he do so "in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."
The fact that the Court has limited the determination of a public figure
to these three standards can be seen from its determination that Mrs. Firestone
was a private figure. On one side, the Court responded to each of Time's conten-
tions that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure by confining its refutation to the
parameters of the delineated standards chosen from Gertz. First, the Court stated
that Mrs. Firestone "did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs
of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself
to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the re-
solution of the issues involved in it."'68 Second, the Court rejected the argument
that the Florida Supreme Court's designation of Mrs. Firestone's divorce as a
"cause celebre" meant that the judicial proceeding was a public controversy thereby
61. Supra note 57 at 345;see 424 U.S. at 453.
62. 418 U.S. at 351.
63. 424 U.S. at 453.
64. 418 U.S. at 351.
65. 424 U.S. at 453.
66. 418 U.S. at 351.
67. 424 U.S. at 453.
68. Supra note 67.
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making Mrs. Firestone a public figure. To accept such an argument, the Court
said, would be to categorize all public controversies as being subject to the actual
malice standard. The Court emphasized that such a subject matter classification
for determining when the actual malice standard is applicable was rejected in
Gertz.6 9 Likewise, the Court spurned the argument that the Firestone divorce
proceeding was a public controversy, thereby making-Mrs. Firestone a public
figure, by emphasizing that Mrs. Firestone had no choice but to go to court to
seek a divorce and as such "[SI he assumed no 'special prominence in the resolu-
tion of public questions." '' 70 Third, the Court precluded the argument that Mrs.
Firestone's press conferences, held during her rather lengthy divorce proceeding,
made her a public figure, saying that no assumption could be made that she in-
tended to use these conferences to influence the merits or outcome of her divorce
proceeding or "to thrust herself to the forefront of some unrelated controversy in
order to influence its resolution. "71
On the other side, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Firestone, also utilized
Gertz language to support his contention that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure.
First, he noted that: (1) the Florida Supreme Court had characterized Mrs.
Firestone as a prominent member of Palm Beach society, and had said her 'mar-
ital difficulties were. . .well-known,' and [her] lawsuit became 'a veritable cause
celebre in social circles across the country' "; (2) she subscribed to a press clipping
service; (3) she instituted the suit for separate maintenance against her husband
and probably knew the public would take interest in it; (4) her divorce proceeding
attracted national news coverage as well as frequent coverage by Miami and Palm
Beach newspapers; and (5) she held several press conferences during the divorce
proceedings. 72 "These facts are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Mary
Alice Firestone was a 'public figure' for purposes of reports on the judicial pro-
ceedings she initiated. ' 7 3 Second, he argued that Mrs. Firestone's access to
the media "for purposes relating to her lawsuit" meant she could resort to the
self-help remedy characteristically more readily available to public figures. "
Third, and more importantly, he contended that because Mrs. Firestone had
chosen to be socially active, to subscribe to a press clipping service, to initiate her
suit for separate maintenance, and to hold press conferences during that lawsuit,
she had voluntarily assumed the risk of careful public scrutiny and, as befits a
public figure, was characteristically less deserving of protection against defama-
tory falsehood than a private person. 75 Fourth, he stated that language in Gertz,
following the standards exclusively adopted from Gertz by the Firestone majority,
declared that even if the generalities it discussed did not pertain to every instance,
"'the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that... public
figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from de-
famatory falsehood concerning them.'76 Thus, Marshall seemed to be arguing
69. Supra note 67 at 454.
70. Supra note 67 at 454-455.
71. Supra note 67 at 455 n.3.
72. Supra note 67 at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Supra note72.
74. Supra note 72 at 485-486.
75. Supra note 72 at 486-487.
76. Supra note 72 at 486.
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that even if all of Mrs. Firestone's actions failed to qualify her as a public figure,
Time was within its rights under Gertz to assume that by her actions she volun-
tarily sought to expose herself to public scrutiny and was thus a public figure.
Therefore, the fact that the Court did not subscribe to Justice Marshall's
convincing arguments that other standards discussed in Gertz dictated that Mrs.
Firestone was a public figure, and instead elected only to consider the case facts
in light of the newly emphasized narrower standards from Gertz, is highly signifi-
cant. An analysis of the Court's application of these standards to the facts of
Firestone reveals that the Court has restricted evaluations of a public figure to
three independent yet mutually exclusive standards.
Although the Court's analysis that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure
centered around the third standard of thrusting oneself to the forefront of a
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,
this neither suggests nor concludes that this is the sole standard by which to
evaluate whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure. To the contrary, as the
Court noted, it is the more commonly applicable standard and the only standard
the Court found applicable to Mrs. Firestone. 7 7 Firestone indicated that one can
be a public figure by assuming a prominent role in societal affairs, but the Court
flatly stated that Mrs. Firestone "did not assume any role of especial prominence
in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society . . ',78 The
Court, however, elaborated no further, leaving one only to speculate as to the
parameters for this standard. Clearly, Mrs. Firestone's involvement in Palm Beach
society did not meet the Court's meaning of "affairs of society" no matter how
especially prominent her role therein may have been and despite the national
news coverage her divorce proceedings received.
This second Firestone standard would seem to include a plaintiff such as
Wally Butts in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 71 In Curtis, a defamatory article in
The Saturday Evening Post accused Mr. Butts, the athletic director and former
head football coach at the University of Georgia, of fixing the 1962 University of
Alabama/University of Georgia football game by providing the Alabama coach
with the details of Georgia's strategy for the game."' Noting that not only had
the Court in Curtis found Mr. Butts to be a public figure, but also that the Court
in Gertz "specifically noted that that decision was 'correct'," Justice Marshall
stated that the Firestone public figure language would not render Butts a public
figure. 81 To the contrary, however, it is clear that this standard would include a
person such as Mr. Butts, who was a voluntarily prominent person prior to the
Post's defamatory report. Thus, it would appear that the emphasis of the standard
centers on voluntarily prominent people such as professional athletes, entertainers
and the like who, one commentator says, "lower courts have long regarded as
public figures."
82
77. Supra note 67.
78. Supra note 77 (emphasis added).
79. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
80. Supra note 79 at 135-136. The Court did not find Butts to be a public official, presumably
from the fact he was paid by a private corporation. Id. at 135-136 n.2, 154.
81. 424 U.S. at 489-490 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Note, . An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plain.




Justice Marshall's dissent shows that disagreement among the justices re-
sulted from the Court's determination in Firestone that "[Djissolution of a mar-
riage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred
to in Gertz. . . .,, Despite the fact that Firestone affirmed the Court's allegiance
to the Gertz position that rejected categorizing a public figure according to
whether the matter involved was one of public interest, Justice Marshall sensed
that the Court had made an ad hoc decision to reject his analysis of Mrs. Firestone
being a public figure in favor of its own judicial whim that Mrs. Firestone's divorce
proceeding was not a matter of legitimate public interest. 84 To the contrary, it
is clear that the Court has not established such an ad hoc public interest test that
would call for judicial divination of who is a public figure, but instead adopted
and applied as a criterion the "public controversy" standard outlined in Gertz. 85
This "public controversy" standard requires that a plaintiff who thrusts
himself to the forefront of a matter of public interest in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved therein, prove that the publisher defamed him
with actual malice. Further, as set out by the Court in Gertz, the matter of public
interest is that particular event which gives rise to the defamation. 86
Turning to the Court's determination that Mrs. Firestone was a private
figure, it is clear that the matter of public interest giving rise to Time's defama-
tory report was the divorce proceeding itself; moreover, it is equally clear that the
Court did not consider that this fact alone made Mrs. Firestone a public figure.
The Court was also concerned that Mrs. Firestone had no choice but to go to
court to obtain her divorce. In short, the Court did not regard her resort to the
only forum available for relief from her failing marriage as evidencing any volun-
tariness on her part to push herself to the forefront of the divorce proceeding,
and the Court thereupon held her not to be a public figure.87
Likewise, the Court decided that Mrs. Firestone's press conferences held
during the divorce proceeding failed to make her a public figure, despite the
obvious fact Mrs. Firestone voluntarily became involved in these conferences.
The Court said that these interviews should not have affected the merits or the
outcome of the trial, and also that the Court could not assume that Mrs. Firestone
intended any such purpose. Moreover, the Court saw no indication that Mrs.
Firestone intended to use the press conferences to thrust herself to the forefront
of some unrelated matter of public interest in order to influence its outcome. 88
Thus, on the one hand, the Court refused to label Mrs. Firestone a public
figure because she did not thrust herself to the forefront of her divorce proceeding
due to the involuntary nature of a judicial proceeding, and, on the other hand,
the Court, while tacitly recognizing the obvious fact that Mrs. Firestone had volun-
tarily chosen to participate in her press conferences, refused to label her a public
figure on the fact of voluntariness alone, noting that it could not be assumed that
she had held the interviews in order to influence the resolution of the trial or any
related matter of public interest.
83. 424 U.S. at 454.
84. Supra note 83 at 487-488 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. 418 U.S. at 345.
86. Supra note 85 at 352.
87. 424 U.S. at 455.
88. Supra note 87 at 454-455 n.3.
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Therefore, the Court's "public controversy" standard as adopted by
Firestone is a two-pronged test requiring the plaintiff (1) to have thrust himself to
the forefront of the matter of public interest, and (2) to have done so for the
purpose of influencing the resolution of the issues involved in that matter of
public interest.
The applicability of this standard can be seen by examining the actions
of retired Major General Edwin Walker in Associated Press v. Walker, 89 Wally
Butts in Curtis,90 and the analysis of the U.S. district court in Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche.9' Walker, as the Court implies, is a good example of a private
person who becomes a public figure under the "public controversy" standard. 92
He became involved in a matter of public interest concerning the enrollment of
James Meredith at the University of Mississippi. Walker thrust himself to the
forefront of that public issue by holding radio and television interviews; his pur-
pose in so doing was to exert his influence in order to insure that the resolution
of that issue was the refusal of university enrollment to Meredith. 93 Athletic
Director Butts, however, although involved in a matter of public interest con-
cerning his alleged participation in a conspiracy to fix a Georgia/Alabama foot-
ball game, is not a public figure under this standard. Like Mrs. Firestone, Butts
did not thrust himself to the forefront of the alleged conspiracy; his "voluntar-
iness" was also not realistic since he was obligated to answer the charges and
defend himself in court. In Hotchner, the plaintiff, a confidant and biographer of
Ernest Hemingway, was defamed by a book which questioned the intimacy and
genuineness of his relationship with Hemingway. 9" The defendant argued that
Mr. Hotchner was a public figure, saying that Hotchner's biography of Hemingway,
and his adaptations of Hemingway's works for the media and the arts, had volun-
tarily injected Hotchner into the public controversy "of Hotchner's personal
relationship with Hemingway.' 9 The Court concluded that Hemingway's later
years as an expatriate were a matter of "considerable public interest," and relying
on dicta in Curtis, determined inter alia that the plaintiff had indeed thrust him-
self into "the controversy surrounding the later years of Ernest Hemingway's life"
and noted that Hotchner had not entered the public discussion as a neutral bio-
grapher, critic, or observer of Hemingway. 96 Although the Court reasoned that
Hotchher's access to publications to rebut defamations concerning him was also
an important factor in determining that Hotchner was a public figure, a reading
of the case indicates that Hotchner had chosen to involve himself in the public
issue concerning Hemingway's last years in order to resolve that issue according
to his personal perception, understanding and observations. Therefore, the decision
that Hotchner was a public figure would be sustained under the "public contro-
versy" standard of Firestone.
This two-part test seems quite clearly to waylay Justice Marshall's fears
89. This case, on certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2d Supreme Judicial District,
was decided together with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.
90. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
91. 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1977).
92. 388 U.S. at 140, 155.
93. Supra note 92 at 159 n.22.
94. 404 F. Supp. at 1043, 1047.
95. Supra note 94 at 1046.
96. Supra note 94 at 1046-1047.
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that the Court was determining whether a public controversy exists solely by
subjectively deciding whether the public interest involved was relevant and
legitimate. To the contrary, existence of a specific public issue giving rise to the
defamation is a prerequisite for testing the standard and the existence of the
public issue alone will not render the plaintiff a public person. Further, the proof
required to satisfy the requirements of the standard negates the ad hoc nature of
the determination, which is his primary complaint.
In Firestone, the Court described the all purpose public figure as one who
occupies a position of persuasive power and influence, yet neither the majority
nor any dissenting opinion discussed Mrs. Firestone according to this standard.91
It is clear, however, that the Court recognizes this standard. It has been suggested
that Gertz requires that the name of such a person be a household word but does
not require that the person's fame extend beyond the local community or be of
national importance. 98 Yet, in his dissent, Justice Marshall does not even suggest
that Mrs. Firestone's prominence "among the '400' of Palm Beach Society," her
publicized social activities, or her frequent press coverage, made her a public figure
for all purposes. This suggests that the Court sees fame or notoriety as axiomati-
cally accompanying this standard, and instead emphasizes the power and influ-
ence public persons in this category must wield. Thus, although courts and pub-
lishers should be in agreement as to when this standard applies, analyzing the
standard in terms of power and influence seems most consistent with the ma-
jority's concern in Firestone for aligning the public figure standards along the
lines of conscious determined efforts towards abandoning anonymity.99
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that Firestone has not, as sug-
gested by Justice Marshall, established the requirement that a person can only
become a public figure by trying to influence the resolution of a public contro-
versy, but rather has clearly narrowed the definition of public figure according to
three independent and mutually exclusive standards: (1) the voluntary assumption
of a role of especial prominence in the affairs of society; or (2) the occupying of
a position of such persuasive power and influence that one is deemed a public
figure for all defamatory utterances concerning him; or (3) the thrusting of one-
self to the forefront of a matter of public interest in order to influence the re-
solution of that public issue according to one's particular persuasion.
It is clear that the Court continues to emphasize that the distinction among
defamation plaintiffs is based on status. It is also apparent, however, that by
eliminating the involuntary public figure category of plaintiffs who are "drawn
into" particular controversies, the Court now emphasizes that voluntariness is an
essential criterion for evaluating whether a person is a public figure. Yet, allowing
for the fact that the voluntariness of normally private persons in certain matters
of public interest could be more apparent than real, the Court has required that
the voluntariness of such persons be for the purpose of influencing the resolution
of that matter of public interest.
97. 424 U.S. at 453.
98. An Analysis, supra note 82 at 1209 n. 427.
99. In Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), the court decided that cojumnist, author,
commentator, candidate, and critic William F. Buckley, Jr., is a public figure for all purposes. The court does
not discuss him as a public figure in terms of his pervasive involvement in society's affairs or the notoriety
or general fame that he obviously possesses, but rather in terms of his influence and power as the leading
advocate of conservative politics and ideology.
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2. A Private Defamation Plaintiff is No Longer Required to Prove Damage to
Reputation
The common law tort of defamation protects the interest one has in being
looked upon with respect, esteem and confidence by fellow members of one's
community; consequently, courts have considered damage to reputation as the
essence of defamation. 100 Accordingly, in Firestone, Time argued that Mrs.
Firestone could not recover consistent with Gertz as, prior to the commencement
of her libel action against Time, she withdrew any claim she had against the
publisher for injury to her reputation."0 In response, the Court said:
Petitioner's theory seems to be that the only compensable injury in a
defamation action is that which may be done to one's reputation, and
that claims not predicated upon such injury are by definition not actions
for defamation. But Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for
other injuries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood may
have had upon a plaintiff's reputation. This does not transform the action
into something other than an action for defamation as that term is meant
in Gertz. In that opinion we made it clear that States could base awards on
elements other than injury to reputation, specifically listing "personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering" as examples of injuries
which might be compensated consistently with the Constitution upon a
showing of fault. Because respondent has decided to forgo recovery for
injury to her reputation, she is not prevented from obtaining compensa-
tion for such other damages that a defamatory falsehood may have caused
her. 102
Although the Court's reply seems rather thorough at first glance, it is at
best superficial. It would appear that Time was not arguing against the obvious,
namely, that Gertz permits the states to compensate private persons for any
proven actual injury suffered as a result of a defamatory falsehood (including, but
not restricted to, impairment of reputation, mental suffering, mental anguish and
the like). Moreover, it would not appear that Time was arguing that Gertz pre-
vented Mrs. Firestone from choosing which proven actual injury she would seek
compensation for. To the contrary, it appears that Time's cQncern centered on
Florida permitting Mrs. Firestone to recover against Time for libel without pre-
senting any evidence of damage to her reputation; in short, Time was arguing that
Florida courts had presumed that Mrs. Firestone's reputation had been dam-
aged. 103
Although Gertz clearly held that a state is prohibited from permitting
recovery of presumed damages absent proof of actual malice, the Court in Fire-
stone easily discounted Time's argument by noting that Florida had complied
with Gertz by only compensating Mrs. Firestone for actual injury (mental pain
100. Prosser, supra note 23, at 739. In Gertz, the Court specifically noted that the plaintiff Gertz
had originally filed his libel action against the publisher of American Opinion claiming "that the falsehoods
published by respondent injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen." 418 U.S. at 327.
lOl. 424 U.S. at 460.
102. Supra note 101.
103. Justice Brennan notes that it appeared from the record that Time was "affirmatively pre-
cluded from offering evidence to refute any possible jury assumption in this regard by a pretrial order granting
'Plaintiff's Motion to Limit Testimony.' " Supra note 101 at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and anguish) supported by "competent evidence." '10 4 Such a peripheral analysis,
however, ignores the very state interest by which the Court authorized state com-
pensation for defamatory injury. In Gertz, the Court recognized "the strong and
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to repu-
tation" and thereupon adopted the actual injury requirement to insure "that
state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to
protect the legitimate interest involved. "105 Although the actual injury require-
ment of Gertz does not require a private plaintiff to recover for injury to reputa-
tion as a prerequisite to recover for other actual injuries, it seems that allowing a
state to permit a private person who does not prove actual malice to recover in a
defamation action, without at least presenting evidence concerning damage to
reputation, clearly violates the express state interest.
Justice Brennan, in his Firestone dissent, suggests that better view. Unlike
the majority in Firestone, he interprets Gertz as allowing a private plaintiff, who
is unable to prove actual malice, to recover for defamation injuries only after
proving, with "competent evidence," actual injury to reputation. Justice Brennan
then sees Gertz as allowing the defamed private plaintiff, after proving actual
injury to his reputation, to recover for any actual injury by submitting "com-
petent evidence." 10 6 Such an analysis would require that Mrs. Firestone must
plead and prove actual injury to her reputation prior to recovering for any actual,
injury resulting from the defamation. This interpretation incorporates the Court's
concern for accomodating the state interest with the important constitutional
interest in promoting the vigorous exercise of first amendment freedoms. More-
over, it prevents a return to the doctrine of presumed damages which invites
gratuitous jury awards and unwarranted jury vindictiveness against unpopular
opinion. 107
The majority opinion in Firestone permits a shift in emphasis in most pri-
vate defamation actions from a focus on the damage to one's reputation to a
focus solely on the plaintiff's internal subjective emotional injuries. This, in turn,
increases the probability that the danager of uncontrolled jury discretion will not
be reduced, as the Gertz prohibition against presumed damages intended. 108
Juries will now be able to speculate as to the plaintiff's loss of reputation and may
include that presumption in their assessment of damages for "proven" emotional
injuries.
Consequently, it would appear that a prospective publisher of a report of
a judicial proceeding concerning a private person may be inclined to censor these
104. Gertz requires that compensation awarded to private persons for a defamatory falsehood be
supported by competent evidence concerning the injury if the plaintiff does not prove actual malice. 418
U.S. at 350. The Court determined that the competent evidence requirement was satisfied by the testimony
of Mrs. Firestone's minister, attorney, friends, and neighbors who "testified-to the extent of [Mrs. Firestone's]
anxiety and concern over Time's inaccurately reporting that she had been found guilty of adultery... [and
Mrs. Firestone's own testimony whereby she elaborated] her fears that her young son would be adversely
affected by this falsehood when he grew older." 424 U.S. at 460-461.
105. 418 U.S. at 348-349 (emphasis added).
106. 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Defendant's burden should consist of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of damage: proof that the defendant communicated the defamatory falsehood to a
third person who understood its application to the plaintiff. See Restatement of Torts sec. 613, comment d
at 301 (1938).
107. 418 U.S. at 349.
108. Supra note 107 at 349-350.
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reports in order to avoid the possibility of an excessive jury award.' 0 9 More im-
portantly, by not being required to prove damage to reputation, a private person
might be encouraged to sue a publisher for libel in a marginal or frivolous case,
hoping all along for a settlement with the publisher who certainly wants to avoid
large litigation expenses. 110 Furthermore, a publisher may find it rather diffi-
cult to utilize summary judgment procedures against such a plaintiff as the pub-
lisher would be forced to prove that no issue of genuine material fact exists, i.e.,
that the plaintiff did not suffer an emotional injury. Moreover, since people's
emotional makeups radically differ, and injury thereto is difficult to discount
without the opportunity to observe witnesses' testimony, and since most states
will adopt a negligence fault standard and thereby involve juries in private defa-
mation cases, courts will be reluctant to grant summary judgment in these cases. " '
Therefore, Firestone appears to have subverted the protection of the
Gertz actual injury requirement in defamation cases involving private persons un-
able to prove actual malice. By permitting Florida to allow Mrs. Firestone to
forego proving actual injury to her reputation from the Time article, the Court
has encouraged state courts to permit a defamation plaintiff to only seek damages
for emotional injuries without first having to base his claim for damages on a
proven actual injury to his reputation. This practice, in turn, reintroduces the
very evil of presumed damages that the actual injury requirement was designed to
prevent, and needlessly encourages the press to censor itself.
3. The Protection to be Given a Defamatory Report of a Judicial Proceeding
Prior to the constitutional incorporation of the actual malice standard
into the law of defamation in New York Times, publishers of defamatory reports
of judicial proceedings could be held liable if the report was inaccurate, or accu-
rate but published with malice." 2 Thereafter, the actual malice requirement of
New York Times meant that public officials and public figures are no longer
entitled to recover against publishers by merely proving that the defamatory re-
port was inaccurate. Moreover, with regard to accurate reports, public persons are
no longer entitled to recover by proving malice, since a determination that a
report is accurate precludes, by definition, proving that the publisher knew his
report was false (inaccurate) or had entertained serious doubt as to the truth
109. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Texas L. Rev. 422, 433 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Anderson).
110. 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 468-469. Professor Anderson suggests that if Gertz is inter-
preted as precluding any recovery absent proof of actual injury to reputation, summary judgment will be
readily available to defendants to preclude costly litigation. Moreover, he notes that such a requirement will
prevent a plaintiff from precluding summary judgment by simply filing his own affadavit claiming that he
suffered emotional injury. Id. at 469 n.218.
112. Restatement of Torts sec. 611 (1938); Newell, Slander and Libel sec. 466 (4th ed. 1924).
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(accuracy) of the report.
Thus, it is apparent that the lone fact of accuracy, in an accurate report
of a judicial proceeding concerning a public person, completely protects the pub-
lisher against liability for any defamatory statement reported therein.11 More-
over, since the Court in Firestone noted that a report of a judicial proceeding con-
cerning a public person is accurate if the report is at least a rational interpreta-
tion of that proceeding, a publisher's burden of proving accuracy does not appear
to be difficult." 4 This is best illustrated by the earlier case of Time, Inc. v.
Pape"' in which a Chicago police officer brought a libel action against Time for
its article about Justice, the fifth volume of the second report of the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights. Officer Pape asserted that Time, in discussing the report's
commentary on police brutality (which had included allegations in a complaint
filed by a private citizen against the plaintiff for police brutality), had quoted
from a summary of the complaint, "without indicating in any way that the charges
were [the private citizen's] rather than independent findings of the Commis-
sion. 1 6 The Court reasoned that Time had adopted "one of a number of pos-
sible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities" and
decided, as a matter of law, that these facts did not establish actual malice. 117
The plaintiff had claimed that Time's conscious omission of the word "alleged"
in its article conveyed the libelous impression that the Commission had inde-
pendently -charged him with police brutality. The Court, on the one hand, con-
ceded that both the context of the Commission's report and the "external evi-
dence of the Report's overall meaning" showed that the "charge" was an alle-
gation rather than a Commission finding.118 On the other hand, the Court also
determined that Time had independently reported that the Commission "took
the charges [made against Officer Pape] to be true." 1 9 Yet, the Court still
declared the Time article to be a rational interpretation of the Commission's
report.
Thus, with regard to public persons, it seems the Court's statement in
Firestone that "demonstration that an article was true would seem to preclude
finding the publisher at fault . . . ." is true. 12
0
It is equally clear that the Court recognizes a conditional privilege for
the press to make accurate but defamatory reports of judicial proceedings con-
113. This is confirmed in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Cox], where the Court required that truth, or, in the case of a report of a judicial proceeding, accuracy, be
recognized as a complete defense to a defamation action brought by a public person:
It is true that in defamation actions, where the protected interest is personal reputation,
the prevailing view is that truth is a defense; and the message of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan . . . , and like cases is that the defense of truth is constitutionally required where
the subject of the publication is a public official or public figure. What is more, the defamed
public official or public figure must prove not only that the publication is false but that it
was knowingly so or was circulated with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Id. at
489-490.
114. 424 U.S. at 459 n.4.
115. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
116. Supra note 115 at 282.
117. Supra note 115 at 290.
118. Supranote 117.
119. Supra note 115 at 289.
120. 424 U.S. at 4 58.
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cerning private persons and to thereby be exempt from state-imposed liability. 121
However, it is clear from Firestone that the Court, in attempting to balance the
First Amendment with the state's interest in compensating private persons for
reputation injury, recognizes that a private plaintiff who becomes involved in a
judicial proceeding can be expected to attract public attention and perhaps have
personally defamatory matters reported to the public. Therefore, in order to
balance the competing interests involved, Firestone requires that for a report of
a judicial proceeding concerning a private person to be accurate, it must at least
be a conceivable interpretation of the proceeding that is factually correct."'2 2
In arguing that its report of Mrs. Firestone's divorce proceeding was con-
stitutionally protected, Time argued that its report was a rational interpretation
of an ambiguous divorce decree. 123 The Court rejected this argument by an-
nouncing that the breathing space afforded publishers to make a rational inter-
pretation of an ambiguous document is confined to reports concerning persons
subject to the actual malice standard. 124 Firestone accordingly denies to a pub-
lisher who reports about a judicial proceeding concerning a private person any
leeway to offer a defamatory interpretation of these proceedings (short of that
provided by the applicable state fault standard) absent proof that the report is
factually correct.
Thus, a publisher of a report of a judicial proceeding concerning a private
person can only claim his report is accurate, and thereby protected (by Firestone)
against civil liability, if the facts he reports to the public are correct. For example,
the Court noted that Time had chosen to interpret Mrs. Firestone's ambiguous
divorce decree as having been granted for cruelty and adultery, when in fact,
"the divorce court never made any such finding. Its judgment provided that
Russell Firestone's 'counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted,'
but did not specify that the basis for the judgment was either of the two grounds
alleged in the counterclaim. '"12' Therefore, since Mrs. Firestone was deemed a
private figure, Time was not permitted any constitutional leeway in offering its
particular interpretation of the divorce decree, as the Court determined that
Time's report was not factually correct.
Yet, with regard to an accurate but defamatory report of a judicial pro-
ceeding concerning a private person, the Court had announced in Cox Broad-
casting v. Cohn that:
[T] he Court has nevertheless carefully left open the question whether the
First and Fourteenth Amendments require that truth be recognized as a
121. See Cox, supra note 113 at 496 where the Court notes:
We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally available
to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed
reasonable man. Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citizens
about the public business and yet stay within the law. The rule would invite timidity and
self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise
be published and that should be made available to the public. At the very least, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully
publishing information released to the public in official court records... Once true infor-
mation is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot
be sanctioned for publishing it.
122. 424 U.S. at 459.
123. Supra note 122 at 457-459, 459 n.4. See note 2 supra .
124. Supra note 122 at 459 n.4.
125. Supra note 122 at 458.
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defense in a defamation action brought by a private person as distin-
guished from a public official or public figure. Garrison.. .recognized that
"different interests may be involved where purely private libels, totally
unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; therefore, nothing we say today
is to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitu-
tional guarantees in the discrete area of purely private libels." 126
Cox thereby confirms that a state is not required by the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press to recognize a defense of truth (accuracy) where the-
plaintiff is a private person.
Only 19 states recognize truth as a complete defense to a defamation
action. In the remaining 31 jurisdictions, truth does not completely exonerate the
defaming party from any liability. 127 Therefore, a publisher will not be pre-
cluded from liability through a claim of accuracy in a state which allows truth
only to be used in mitigation of damages (in a defamation action) and which has a
fault standard of less than actual malice. Similarly, in a state which recognizes
truth as a defense (to a defamation action) and which also has a fault standard of
less than actual malice, a jury could find a publisher liable despite the accuracy of
his report, provided the plaintiff could prove that the publication took place in
violation of the individual state's fahlt standard. In a state which recognizes truth
as a complete defense, however, or which has adopted actual malice as its fault
standard for private defamation, proof of the accuracy of the report would per se
preclude holding the publisher liable. Therefore, after Firestone, it appears that
accurate reports of judicial proceedings concerning private persons may or may
not be privileged depending on the individual state's fault standard and the dif-
ferences statutorily applied by individual states to the use of truth as a defense
against a defamation action.
To summarize, Firestone has established that the test for determining
whether a report of a judicial proceeding is accurate differs according to the status
of the plaintiff. Specifically, a report concerning a public official or a public figurp,
who are subject to the actual malice fault standard, must at least be a rational inter-
pretation of the proceeding, whereas a report concerning a private person, who
can be subject to a fault standard of less than actual malice, must be a factually
correct conceivable interpretation of the proceeding. Furthermore, the Court re-
cognizes that the designation of a report concerning a person subject to the actual
malice standard as accurate is, by definition, a complete defense to a defamation
action.
126. 420 U.S. 469, 490-491 (1975). However, Justice Powell argued that Gertz had mandated
that truth be recognized as a complete defense to a private defamation suit because of its requirement that a
state fault standard "be related to the defendant's failure to avoid publication of 'defamatory falsehood'...
if the statements are true, the standard contemplated by Gertz cannot be satisfied." Id. at 499 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
127. Thomas, The Law of Libel and Slander and Related Action 39-43 (3rd.ed. 1973). Sixteen of
these states recognize that proving the truth of defamatory statements only serves to mitigate damages. The
remaining 15 adopt a qualified defense which may require the defendant to prove that the true statement
was a matter of public interest or proper for public information or that it was published for the public good
and not for spiteful or personal interests. But see Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 582, comment a at
37 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) (doubting the validity of such statutes because they infringe on the freedom
of speech and press).
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Firestone is, however, unclear as to whether accuracy in a report con-
cerning a private person who is subject to a fault standard of less than actual
malice protects the publisher from liability for libel. The Court has declared that
a state is not constitutionally required to recognize a defense of truth in defama-
tion cases where the plaintiff is a private person. This seems to allow any of the
31 states not recognizing truth as a complete defense in a defamation action to
hold a publisher liable for an accurate yet defamatory report of a judicial pro-
ceeding. In Firestone, the Court said that "[T] he public interest in accurate re-
ports of judicial proceedings is substantially protected by Cox. . .[and] demon-
stration that an article [is] true would seem to preclude finding the publisher at
fault, see Cox .... " 128 This statement may mean that the Court would recognize
holding a publisher liable for an accurate report of a judicial proceeding concerning
a private person as a legitimate exercise of the state's interest in compensating
private persons for injury to reputation. However, in order to balance the com-
peting interest of the First Amendment, it would appear that the Court in such
cases would require that the content of the accurate report "warn a reasonably
prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential." '12 9
Finally, in regard to inaccurate and defamatory reports of judicial pro-
ceedings, Firestone announced that "Gertz provides an adequate safeguard for the
constitutionally protected interests of the press and affords it a tolerable margin
for error by requiring some type of fault." 130 Thus, by itself, the inaccuracy of
a report of a judicial proceeding does not subject the publisher to liability for de-
famation injuries caused by the publication of the report. However, by reintro-
ducing presumed damages into private defamation, 131 the Court has encouraged
publishers subject to a fault standard of less than actual malice to curtail the re-
porting of judicial proceedings concerning private persons.
AFTER FIRESTONE: A NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Since New York Times, it has been clear that the Court has been striving
to develop a national standard to determine when the media should be held liable
for publishing a defamatory falsehood. Firestone is the Court's most recent effort
to eliminate the uncertainties that have arisen from this 12-year effort. As such,
it appears that the decision has provided some clarification.
First, the constitutional protection given defamatory reports of judicial
proceedings by the media is neither an absolute privilege to report about activities
in the courts nor a right that is lost only by proof that the report was published
with actual malice. Rather, the protection afforded defamatory reports of judicial
proceedings, and the margin of permissible inaccuracy allowed to a publisher, is
now dependent on the status of the person defamed.
Second, the Court has chosen to narrow the criteria for determining who is
a public figure from the rather amorphous language discussed in Gertz into three
mutually exclusive standards.
128. 424 U.S. at 457-458 (emphasis added).
129. 418 U.S. at 348.
130. 424 U.S. at 457.
131. See text accompanying notes 108-111 suprL
1977]
Journal of Legislation
Third, in a private defamation case, a state may not award damages without
specifically having applied its fault standard to the case.
In addition to the foregoing clarifications, Firestone has also created some
confusion. First, a private plaintiff may now sue in defamation without pleading
injury to reputation. Heretofore, damage to reputation has been the essence of a
defamation case.
Second, Firestone permits defamation plaintiffs to seek damages based
only on emotional injuries, and reinstates the power of juries to presume damages
and to grant gratuitous money awards to plaintiffs. Gertz had clearly prohibited
awards of presumed damages to a defamed private plaintiff absent proof of actual
malice, and acknowledged that the actual injury requirement was expressly
designed to prevent such jury action.
It seems apparent that most of the impetus for the continuing refinement
and standardization of defamation law will have to come from the judicial process.
In promulgating a national standard for defamation, the Court, as one commen-
tator notes, has adopted a federal rule having the same force and effect as if it had
been adopted by Congress. 132 It seems doubtful that Congress will attempt to
devise such a standard, as Congressional legislation aimed at affecting the sub-
stantive development of this standard runs the risk of being held unconstitutional
for restraining first amendment freedoms.
There is an important public policy need for legislation to provide the
plaintiff with alternative, non-money remedies, designed to vindicate the plaintiff's
reputation without impairing first amendment freedoms and protections.
State legislatures, therefore, have an opportunity, within the limitations
prescribed by the Supreme Court, to establish alternative remedies for defamation,
in order to provide a faster and easier means for a defamed person to restore his
reputation.
An award of money damages to a plaintiff in a defamation case, based on
injury to his reputation and feelings (or, after Firestone, for injury to his feelings
alone) is often unrelated to reason or logic; clearly, it can be a windfall for the
plaintiff.
Moreover, if the plaintiff fails to prove either actual malice or the partic-
ular state's fault standard, he will not be entitled to damages; thus, the plaintiff's
reputation may be all the more damaged, as it will appear that the defamation was
true.
It therefore appears that the sole utilization of the damage remedy as a
vindication for a defamatory falsehood by the media seems of questionable
value. ' 3
3
The American Law Institute has suggested inter alia that these goals can
be achieved by the use of a declaratory relief remedy and the awarding of attorney
fees in defamation actions.' 34 Legislation permitting a plaintiff in a defamation
case to seek a declaratory judgment that the statement published is untrue would
132. Lawhorne, Defamation and Public Officials: The Evolving Law of Libel 282 (1971).
133. See Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 621, Special Notes on Remedies for Defamation
OtherThan Damages at 81-82 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
134. Supra note 133 at 82-85.
[Vol. 4: 147
19771 Defamation After Firestone 169
allow the plaintiff to reestablish his reputation but would provide for no mone-
tary award other than attorney fees. The statutory provision authorizing the
awarding of the plaintiff's attorney fees in such actions would encourage a plain-
tiff to defend his reputation through the means of a suit for a declaratory judg-
ment, and would provide an equitable alternative to the present remedy of exclu-
sively seeking money damages.
Thus, state legislation providing alternative remedies for defamation, in
addition to the present practice of awarding money damages, will provide the
essential augmentation that the ongoing judicial transformation of defamation law
needs.
